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NOTES AND COMMENTS
WILLS
POWER OF TESTATOR TO DESIGNATE AN ATTORNEY
The question presented in the case In Re Estate of Minnie Shinnick,
3 Ohio Op. 458 (October 7, 1935) involves the right of an executor
to refuse to employ as counsel in the administration of the estate, an
attorney designated by the testator to serve in that capacity. It was held
that the executor could not be compelled to retain counsel requested in
the will.
The court relies in part on Sections 105o6-3 and 10509-193 of the
Probate Code. It seems that neither of the above sections is particularly
pertinent to the question presented. The first section relates to the filing
of the name of the attorney with the court by the fiduciary when he is
appointed. This section goes no further than to provide what procedure
shall be followed after the appointment of the attorney, namely, to file
the name of counsel with the court, this for the court's information.
That this is the legislative intent is strongly brought out by this language:
"After the name has been so filed, notices to such fiduciary in his of-
ficial capacity shall also be sent by the Probate Court to such attorney
who shall have authority to sign waiver of service of any or all such
notices upon him."
The other section, 10509-193, relating to payment of attorney's
fees by the executor and the allowance to him of such expenditures,
seems to have little or no connection with the right of a testator to
direct who shall act as the attorney in the administration of his estate.
The result represented in the instant case finds ample support from
the standpoint of policy alone. As pointed out by the court, the sole
responsibility for the administration of the estate rests on the fiduciary;
therefore, he should have discretion to appoint whomever he chooses as
his attorney. The close relationship which exists between an attorney
and client demands complete harmony between the two and full con-
fidence of the one in the other. It was argued that the executor or
fiduciary might refuse the appointment unless he accepts the designated
attorney; to which the court answered that it was its duty to carry out
the testator's will as far as possible and that the court is so doing when
an executor is permitted to assume his duties, though he refuse to accept
the appointment of the attorney. The following cases support the con-
clusion reached by the court. In Re Ogier, lo Cal. 381, 35 Pac. 9oo,
4o Am. St. Rep. 6I (1894). Pickett's Will, 49 Ore. 127, 89 Pac. 377
(907); Leadbetter v. Price, 1O2 Ore. 159, 199 Pac. 633 (1922);
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Foster v. Elsley, i Ch. D. 518 (1881); M. B. Young v. Jas. Alex-
ander, Executor, 84 Tenn. io8 (1885); Matter of Caldwell, i88
N.Y. 115, at 120; Matter of Wallach, 164 N.Y. App. 6oo, 15o N.Y.
Supp. 302 affirmed without opinion in 215 N.Y. 622, IO9 N.E. io94
(1915); In Re Thistlewaite, 104 N.Y. Supp. 264 (1907).
A question closely analogous is presented when the testator expresses
the intent that certain persons be continued in a designated employment
after his death. Where precatory words alone are used, it has been held
that the fiduciary is not bound to give effect to the testator's wish. Shaw
v. Lawless, 5 Cl. & Fin. 129 (1837); Fender v. Stevens, 2 Phil. 142
(1848); Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 263 (1926); Jewel
v. Barnes, Admr., IO Ky. 329, 61 S.W. 36o (19oI). But where the
directions are mandatory, it has been held that one designated by the
testator to continue in an employment other than that of attorney has
an enforceable right. Hibbert v. Hibbert, 3 Mic. Rep. 681 (1845);
Williams v. Corbett, 8 Sin. 349 (1837)- In Hughes v. Hiscox, n1o
N.Y. Misc. 141, 181 N.Y. Supp. 395 (1920), the court refused to
enforce the provision to continue an employee though the direction was
mandatory, though the parties were the same in Hughes v. Hiscox, 105
N.Y. Misc. 521, 174 N.Y.S. 564 (1909) as in the latter case, where
the employee was told that his relief was to seek an equitable charge on
the estate in the hands of the executor. This was sought and denied in
the case reported in 1o N.Y. Misc. 141-
The doctrine, however, is not without a contrary view. In Rivet v.
Battistella, 167 La. 766, 127 So. 289 (1929), it was held that a pro-
vision of a will designating an attorney to settle an estate was binding
on those taking under the will. The court points out that'in those
jurisdictions which follow what might be termed the majority rule, the
courts have overlooked the fact that the testator may impose such condi-
tions as he sees fit on his executor and he may accept or decline the trust
if he is unwilling to comply with its terms. The court also relies in part
on a statute in Louisiana which provides that the designation of an at-
torney shall be binding on banks appointed as executors and trustees.
The passage of this statute indicated that the Legislature did not consider
such a condition in a will against public policy. Therefore, since a testator
can put any conditions he may wish so long as they are not opposed to
public policy, the condition is valid.
The result reached in In Re Shinnick is sound, based not only on
precedent but also on policy. It would seem that the above cited cases
concerning the designation of an employee to continue in the service of
the estate after the testator's death where the employee is not an at-
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torney are authority for the position maintained by the court. It is to be
noted that only a wish or desire was expressed that a certain attorney be
appointed. This language was used by the testator: "It is my wish and
I hereby request that the court appoint G. Taylor to be the attorney for
my executrix." If it is decided that no right can be created by the use
of precatory words in the case of one who occupies a much less impor-
tant place than a legal advisor in the administration of the estate or trust,
how much more certainly it must follow that the testator cannot by
similar words create an enforceable right in an attorney upon whom the
executor, who is solely responsible for the management of the estate,
must depend for his legal advice. It seems that the case could have
been decided on this narrow ground-that the mere wish or desire of a
testator to appoint a designated attorney is not enough to create an
enforceable right in him. VERNON -. WENGER.
